








Commodity Price Volatility, Democracy 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3619 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Commodity Price Volatility, Democracy 





We use a new dataset on non-resource GDP to examine the impact of commodity price 
volatility on economic growth in a panel of up to 158 countries during the period 1970-2007. 
Our main finding is that commodity price volatility leads to a significant increase in non-
resource GDP growth in democracies, but to no significant increase in autocracies. To explain 
this result, we show that increased commodity price volatility leads to a statistically 
significant and quantitatively large increase in net national saving in democracies. In 
autocracies, on the other hand, net national saving decreased significantly. Our results hold 
true when using indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions in lieu of indicators 
of political institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Volatile terms of trade pose serious macroeconomic challenges to developing countries. In this 
paper, we focus on the effects that commodity price volatility may have on economic growth in 
commodity-exporting countries. Figure 1 shows that over the past decades the volatility associated 
with various international commodity price indices is far greater than the volatility associated with 
manufactured product price indices.
1 This evidence suggests that countries that specialize in raw 
commodity exports face much greater macroeconomic volatility than countries specializing in the 
export of manufactured products. The presence of volatility may complicate saving/investment 
decisions by governments,  firms and households  and,  in  turn,  affect long-run economic 
performance in commodity-exporting countries. For instance, increased volatility in government 
revenue may call for higher levels of precautionary saving.
2 Because revenues derived from natural 
resources transit directly to the government coffers (e.g., through state ownership, taxation or export 
tariffs), they may be prone to rent-seeking behavior and thus end up not being saved or invested 
appropriately. In that context, institutions which may prevent misappropriation of natural resources 
and promote good policies may also play a crucial role in moderating the impact of volatility on 
economic growth  in commodity exporting countries.  In this paper, we  examine the impact of 
commodity price volatility on economic growth and net national saving using a new dataset on non-
resource GDP in a panel of up to 158 countries during the period 1970-2007.
3 
This paper aims to make two main contributions. First, unlike previous studies, the paper 
specifically focuses on volatility stemming from commodity price fluctuations at an infra-annual 
frequency.  Indeed,  when considering annual averages, one finds that the crude oil price has 
                                                 
1 This holds true when considering manufactured price indices for US imports and exports.  
2 This is especially the case in the presence of incomplete markets that may incapacitate governments in commodity-
exporting countries trying to hedge against volatility using financial instruments.  
3 Our goal here is to assess the impact of volatility on saving broadly understood and not necessarily from a perspective 
of evaluating sustainability. We thus use overall saving rather than genuine saving (saving net of resource depletion). In 
addition, the Hartwick rule (setting genuine saving equal to zero, see Hartwick, 1977) is a commonly used benchmark 
but could be seen as  too restrictive. Indeed, it fails to take into account the potential yield on the investments made out 
of “rent savings.” If these are high, there can be considerable consumption out of rents on a sustainable basis. 3 
increased by 36 percent between 2007 and 2008.
4 However, when considering monthly averages, 
one finds that the crude oil price has decreased by 69 percent between July and December 2008. 
This suggests that the frequency at which the fluctuations in commodity prices are observed reflects 
very different realities worth pondering  when investigating the  economic  impact  of those 
fluctuations. From a policy perspective, it is, for instance, crucial for the government to consider the 
monthly changes in government revenues for liquidity management purposes  rather than the 
average yearly changes in revenues (which are certainly more relevant for annual budget planning). 
Also, monetary authorities in commodity-exporting countries need  to consider fluctuations in 
commodity prices at an infra-annual frequency to be able to conduct appropriate monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Second, the paper focuses on the effect of commodity price volatility on the 
non-resource sector. To do so, we use a new dataset on non-resource GDP allowing us to avoid the 
“noise” introduced by the resource sector’s contribution to overall GDP.
5 Indeed, separating the 
resource sector’s  contribution from overall GDP allows us to examine the externality that the 
resource sector activity exercises on the non-resource sector’s long-run productivity. From a policy 
perspective, non-resource-sector GDP should be the relevant measure to be used when assessing the 
long-run economic viability of an economy whose natural resources have been depleted.  
Our main finding is that increased commodity price volatility leads to a significant increase 
in non-resource GDP growth in democracies, but to no significant increase in growth in autocracies. 
To explain this result, we show that increased commodity price volatility leads to a statistically 
significant and quantitatively large increase in net national saving in democracies. In autocracies, on 
the other hand,  net  national saving decreased  significantly.  Our results hold true when using 
indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions in lieu of indicators of political institutions. 
                                                 
4 The crude oil (petroleum) price used is a simple average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate 
and the Dubai Fateh, US$ per barrel, available from IMF (2011). 
5 Section 2 describes the estimation of non-resource GDP which takes into account the depletion of the stock of natural 
resources. 4 
Figure 1. Volatility of Commodity and Manufactured Product Indices 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011), IMF (2011) and the authors’ own calculations. The volatility is 
measured by the annual standard deviation of monthly price indices deflated by the US CPI index. 
 
This paper is related to the literature on macroeconomic volatility. Drawing on several of 
their earlier papers, Aghion and Banerjee (2005) explore the various causal connections between the 
trend growth of output and the volatility of output around the trend, concluding from empirical 
cross-country evidence that volatility hurts growth. Along similar lines, Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
provide evidence that volatility in economic growth diminishes average growth in a sample of 92 
countries as well as in  a sample of OECD countries.  Even so, Gylfason et al. (2010, Ch. 4) 
demonstrate that significantly reduced output volatility from earlier times to the post World War II 
period in several industrial countries including the United States, Canada, France, Germany and the 
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Building on Ramey and Ramey (1995), Mobarak (2005) finds that more democracy leads to lower 
volatility and more volatility reduces growth using simultaneous equation estimation method. He 
concludes that the volatility channel is crucial to understanding how democracy affects growth. 
Similarly, our paper provides empirical evidence that democracy moderates the effect of volatility 
originating from (plausibly exogenous) fluctuations in international commodity prices on economic 
growth.  
This paper also relates to the literature stressing the importance of political institutions for 
improving policy outcomes (see, e.g., Persson, 2002). In their seminal contribution to the growth 
and institutions literature, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) show that political institutions are key 
determinants of long-run economic development. 
Further, this paper relates more directly to the literature on the so-called “resource curse,” 
focusing specifically on the effects of natural resource endowments on the economic performance 
of  commodity-exporting  countries.
  This literature emphasizes  several channels through which 
resource windfalls may affect economic performance,  including  the “Dutch  disease”  and 
deteriorating institutions, to name a few (for a survey, see Frankel, 2011). This paper departs from 
the traditional Dutch-disease literature’s distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors by 
focusing instead on the distinction between the resource and non-resource sectors. Overall, there is 
some evidence, albeit somewhat controversial, that commodity-exporting countries tend to grow 
less rapidly than non-commodity-exporting countries. Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), Auty (2001) 
and Gylfason (2001) provided early evidence of a significant negative correlation between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth. In contrast, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) take a more 
skeptical view of the resource curse. Using traditional cross-sectional growth regressions, Alexeev 
and Conrad (2009) find that the empirical association between resource dependence and economic 
performance is not robust to using samples with different starting years or to the inclusion of 6 
additional controls, but they leave initial income out of their regressions, thus omitting conditional 
convergence, a crucial growth mechanism, from consideration.  Our paper contributes to this 
literature by focusing on the volatility channel of the resource curse using data on non-resource-
sector GDP growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the estimation strategy and  main  results. Section 4  discusses  a number of robustness 
checks. Section 5 summarizes our main findings.  
2. Data 
2.1. Non-resource GDP (NRGDP) 
Non-resource GDP is approximated by subtracting the real value of natural resource rents from total 
GDP in 2005 PPP-adjusted USD (see Hamilton and Ruta, 2008, for details on the computation of 
resource rents).
6 Natural resources give rise to rents because they are not produced; in contrast, for 
produced goods and services competitive forces will expand supply until economic profits are 
driven to zero. An economic rent represents an excess return to a given factor of production. For 
each type of resource and each country, unit resource rents are thereby  derived by taking the 
difference between world prices (to reflect the social opportunity cost of resource extraction) and 
the average unit extraction or harvest costs (including a “normal” return on capital). Unit rents are 
then multiplied by the physical quantity extracted or harvested to arrive at total rent.
7 
2.2. Commodity Price Index and Volatility 
We use a country-specific and plausibly exogenous commodity price index. The index consists of a 
geometric average of international prices of various commodities using (time-invariant) weights 
                                                 
6 The data on resource rents are taken from WDI (2011). The GDP data are from Heston et al. (2009). 
7 The energy resources include oil, natural gas and coal, while metals and minerals include bauxite, copper, gold, iron 
ore, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin and zinc. 7 
based on the average value of exports of each commodity in the GDP for a given country. Annual 
international commodity price data cover  the  years  1970-2007  and are taken  from UNCTAD 
Commodity Statistics, while our data on the value of commodity exports come from the NBER-
United Nations Trade Database. Because the time-series behavior of many international commodity 
prices is highly persistent, commodity price  shocks  are identified by the (log) change in the 
international commodity price.
8  Our measure of volatility is the annual standard deviation of 
monthly changes in our commodity price index. The correlation between the log change in our 
commodity price index and its standard deviation is rather low and negative (-0.14). This suggests 
that the information contained in these two statistics is quite different and both statistics are worthy 
of use separately in our empirical analysis. 
2.3. Democracy 
Democracy is measured by the revised combined Polity score (Polity2) of the Polity IV database 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The classification uses a 10-point scale that categorizes four 
attributes of political systems: the competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment and the constraints on the chief 
executive. At one end of the scale, +10, are the most politically competitive and open democracies. 
At the other, –10, are the least open and competitive autocracies. Following Persson and Tabellini 
(2003, 2006) and the Polity IV project, we classify countries as democracies (autocracies) if their 
Polity2 score is strictly positive (negative). 
                                                 
8 The commodities included in the commodity export price index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, 
gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case there were multiple prices listed for the 
same commodity a simple arithmetic price average was used. 8 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Estimation Strategy 
To examine the effects of commodity price volatility on long-run per capita economic growth, we 









3.2. Economic Growth 
The statistical results are presented in Table 2.
13 Our results suggest that the average marginal effect 
of commodity price volatility on NRGDP growth is both statistically and economically significant. 
Indeed, we find that an increase in commodity price volatility by one standard deviation leads to an 
increase in NRGDP growth by slightly less than a third of a standard deviation, as shown in column 
(3). This result contradicts the view that volatility is harmful for economic growth in commodity-
exporting countries. However, the coefficient on volatility is no longer significant when we do not 
control for the annual change in our commodity price index, as shown in column (1).  
 
                                                 
13 First-order and second-order serial correlation tests and the Hansen test on over-identifying moment conditions (not 
reported in the tables) indicate that the estimated models are correctly specified. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min     Max
Δ Log NRGDP per capita 1392 0.016 0.046 -0.427 0.353
Initial log NRGDP 1208 8.505 1.139 5.551 11.259
Δ log Commodity Price Index 1504 0.000 0.003 -0.012 0.027
Volatility 1050 0.053 0.084 0.000 0.717
Diversification 1060 0.170 0.199 0.004 1.000
Credit 1156 37.967 35.758 0.000 276.120
Trade 1214 79.013 43.391 7.210 423.800
Saving 981 9.897 11.763 -38.492 167.13010 
Table 2. Commodity Price Volatility and NR GDP Growth 
 
 
We find that changes in our commodity price index and trade openness have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on NRGDP growth. Export diversification and financial development 
have no statistically significant effect  on NRGDP growth but are,  nonetheless,  useful control 
variables. The significance and sign of those latter results should, however, be taken with caution as 
they might be plagued by endogeneity. This is less so the case for our measure of volatility in 
commodity prices as it is based on a plausibly exogenous source of fluctuations,  namely, 
international  commodity  prices. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that changes in domestic 
conditions or, more specifically, changes in the non-resource sector in the countries included in our 
sample do not affect international commodity prices.  
When restricting our sample to autocracies, we find that commodity price volatility does not 
have a statistically significant effect on NRGDP growth, as shown in columns (4) and (6). It should 
also be noted that a change in commodity prices has a negative though not statistically significant 
effect on NRGDP growth, as shown in columns (5) and (6). The negative sign associated with the 
change in commodity prices  echoes the results pertaining to the resource curse hypothesis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Initial log NRGDP -0.0643** -0.110*** -0.0682** 0.00578 -0.0239 0.00004 -0.0822** -0.0715* -0.0375
(0.0295) (0.0406) (0.0310) (0.0257) (0.0301) (0.0263) (0.0402) (0.0410) (0.0438)
Volatility 0.0782 0.153*** -0.0448 0.0188 0.162** 0.277***
(0.0604) (0.0554) (0.0752) (0.0704) (0.0732) (0.0846)
Δ log Commodity Price Index 2.740* 3.891** -2.349 -2.316 3.387* 6.435**
(1.510) (1.533) (2.048) (2.186) (1.909) (2.745)
Diversification 0.0101 -0.113 -0.0864 0.116 0.0397 0.0983 -0.0179 -0.0926 -0.0666
(0.0529) (0.0696) (0.0660) (0.0814) (0.0952) (0.111) (0.0552) (0.0583) (0.0593)
Credit 0.000562 0.00142** 0.000661 -0.000198 -0.000209 -0.000460 0.000665 0.000769 0.000216
(0.000388) (0.000583) (0.000406) (0.000418) (0.000556) (0.000423) (0.000470) (0.000502) (0.000496)
Trade 0.000698*** 0.000474 0.000477** 0.000731** 0.00145*** 0.00122*** 0.000565*** 0.000490* 0.000145
(0.000189) (0.000301) (0.000218) (0.000363) (0.000366) (0.000330) (0.000186) (0.000264) (0.000259)
Number of observations 555 555 555 197 197 197 357 357 357
Number of countries 150 150 150 61 61 61 88 88 88
Fixed effects are included but not reported.
Note: The dependent variable is Δ Log NRGDP per capita. The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses below the point estimates. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence,*** 99 percent confidence.
All Countries Autocracies Democracies11 
suggesting that ample resource endowments weaken economic performance. When restricting our 
sample to democracies, however,  we find that volatility has  a statistically and economically 
significant effect on NRGDP growth, as shown in columns (7) and (9).
14 Using estimates from 
column (9), we find that an increase by one standard deviation in volatility leads to an increase by 
more than half a standard deviation in NRGDP growth. This effect is much larger than in our 
overall sample. This result could suggest that democracies have overcome the challenges posed by 
increased volatility by adopting policies that promote growth. In the following sub-section, we 
provide some evidence that the saving channel can help explain why more volatility may lead to 
more rapid economic growth in commodity-exporting countries. Indeed, higher saving could help 
shelter commodity-exporting  countries  from shortfalls in government revenue, help finance  or 
guarantee  domestic private investments and also guard those countries against hasty  spending 
programs, including excessively large and wasteful public spending.  
By contrast, more volatility – resource booms, in particular – may impede economic growth 
in autocracies. When national wealth is stored largely in a natural resource, renewable or not, a 
more common occurrence in autocracies than in democracies, there is less need for financial 
intermediation to conduct day-to-day transactions. Dissaving at the macroeconomic level can take 
place through more rapid depletion of the resource and saving can take place through less rapid 
depletion, or of more rapid renewal in the case of renewable natural resources. In some countries, 
such as the oil-rich OPEC states, saving also takes the form of deposits in foreign banks. In this 
case, domestic financial intermediation becomes even less important. In contrast, when saving is 
piled up at home in the form of physical capital, or human capital, domestic banks and equity 
markets assume paramount importance. By linking up domestic savers and investors, the domestic 
financial system contributes to a more efficient allocation of capital across sectors and firms, a 
                                                 
14 We also find that increases in the commodity price index lead to a statistically significant increase in NRGDP growth. 
Those results are broadly in line with those of Melhum et al. (2006) who provide some evidence that good economic 
institutions can alleviate the resource curse.  12 
growth benefit more commonly absent from autocracies than from democracies.  
Not only is it thus possible for recurrent commodity booms associated with abundant natural 
resources to hamper the development of the financial system and hence to distort the allocation of 
capital but economic growth may slow down due to the  detrimental effect of financial 
backwardness on the quantity and quality of saving and investment. King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b) find that indicators of financial development and their predetermined components predict 
subsequent growth, physical capital accumulation and improvements in the efficiency of capital 
allocation.
15 Hence, our hypothesis that natural resource dependence tends to go along with an 
underdeveloped financial system means, if King and Levine are right, that resource dependence also 
tends to hinder future gains in efficient capital deepening and economic growth. 
Those results are in line with  Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)  who  show  that political 
institutions are key determinants of long-run economic development. Our results are also consistent 
with those of Mobarak (2008) who reports that democracies lead to more rapid growth through the 
volatility channel. It is important to reiterate that our results hold when controlling for variables 
such as economic diversification and financial development, which are potentially important factors 
mitigating volatility. 
3.3. Saving 
The results reported above suggest that commodity price volatility may have improved economic 
performance in democracies but not in autocracies. To scrutinize and interpret our results, we now 
systematically  investigate  the  impact of commodity  price volatility on  saving behavior in 
commodity-exporting countries.  
Table 3 presents the results of our estimates of saving regressions. On average, we find that 
                                                 
15 Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) report similar findings.  13 
commodity price volatility has a positive and economically significant effect on the saving rate as 
shown in column (1). Using results from column (1), we find that an increase in volatility by one 
standard deviation leads to an increase of saving by about a third of a standard deviation. However, 
the coefficient associated with volatility is no longer statistically significant when we do not control 
for changes in our commodity price index. 
Table 3. Commodity Price Volatility and the Saving Rate 
 
 
We also find, throughout columns (2) to (9), that changes in commodity prices encourage 
saving. This result suggests that an increase in revenue originating from commodity exports leads to 
increased saving across the spectrum of political institutions. However, our quantification exercise 
indicates that the response  of saving to  an increase in commodity prices  is twice as large in 
democracies as in autocracies.
16  This result suggests  that more accountable  governments  save 
effectively more than autocracies that tend to squander revenues derived from the exploitation of 
natural resources. Indeed, Gelb (1988) provides  anecdotal evidence that governments in 
commodity-exporting countries often embark on large investment projects following commodity 
price booms. He argues that those investment projects were plagued by inefficiencies and also 
contributed to resource misallocation.  
                                                 
16 While the coefficients on volatility in columns (6) and (9) and the standard deviation in commodity price index are 
quite close, the standard deviation associated with saving is twice as high in autocracies as in democracies. It follows 
that the effect of commodity price changes is twice as high in democracies as in autocracies. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagged Saving 0.572*** 0.382*** 0.449*** 0.300*** 0.380*** 0.390*** 0.673*** 0.440*** 0.506***
(0.0687) (0.0642) (0.0656) (0.0874) (0.0807) (0.0906) (0.0864) (0.0985) (0.104)
Volatility 19.60 48.48*** -52.51** 3.912 38.61** 47.15***
(17.48) (18.49) (25.06) (32.01) (18.40) (17.57)
Δ log Commodity Price Index 2,270*** 2,381*** 2,312*** 2,013*** 1,438** 2,025***
(299.4) (387.5) (289.5) (439.7) (727.2) (708.3)
Credit 0.113** -0.217*** -0.213*** 0.0762 -0.373*** -0.317*** 0.0151 -0.0802 -0.142**
(0.0447) (0.0526) (0.0629) (0.104) (0.0903) (0.106) (0.0340) (0.0688) (0.0650)
Number of observations 623 623 623 238 238 238 384 384 384
Number of countries 157 157 157 67 67 67 89 89 89
All Countries Autocracies Democracies
Note: The dependent variable is the saving rate. The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the point estimates. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence,*** 99 percent confidence.Fixed effects are included but not reported. 14 
Further, we find that in autocracies more volatility translates into a statistically significant 
decrease in saving, as shown in column (4). The coefficient associated with volatility becomes 
positive when controlling for changes  in our commodity price index but is not statistically 
significant. In contrast, in democracies more volatility leads to a statistically and economically 
significant increase in saving as shown in columns (7) and (9). Using estimates from column (9) we 
find that an increase by one standard deviation in volatility in democracies increases the saving rate 
by two fifths of a standard deviation. This result again suggests that only governments which are 
subject to the scrutiny of the public as is the case in democracies save more when faced by higher 
volatility. Indeed, more accountable governments choose to build a buffer stock to effectively hedge 
against the vagaries of international commodity markets.
17 Moreover, governments in democracies 
are less prone to and less tolerant of rent seeking and, therefore, are likely to spend their revenues 
more effectively, yielding higher saving rates and higher rates of long-run economic growth. These 
results are consistent with the political economy literature which has stressed the importance of 
political institutions for better policy outcomes (see, e.g., Persson, 2002).  
4. Robustness Checks  
To test whether our results are robust to the removal of outliers, observations with excessively high 
leverage were excluded from the sample. Specifically, all observations with DFBETAi,j statistics, 
where i indicates the country and j the time period, with an absolute value above a cutoff point 
equal to 2/√n,  where  n  is  the number of observations in the original sample,  were  excluded 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 32-39, and Besley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). For instance, we 
ended up removing 57, 13 and 27 observations from the samples used in the regressions presented 
in columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2 (these results are not reported in the tables). The results 
                                                 
17 The market for hedging appears to remain relatively impracticable for many commodity-exporting countries. Mexico 
is one of the few countries to have implemented a full hedging program using financial instruments. In that context, 
commodity-exporting countries are left with the sole option of building strong institutions to insulate themselves from 
procyclical and wasteful spending programs.  15 
presented in Tables 2 and 3 are virtually unchanged and are robust to the use of different values for 
the cutoff point above which observations are dropped. 
A relevant question is whether our results are  robust to using  the quality of economic 
institutions rather than political institutions. Indeed, the quality of economic institutions could be 
seen as an outcome of political institutions. The indicators of the quality of political institutions 
display a relatively high correlation with economic institutions (0.46 for the rule of law; 0.57 for 
corruption). Also, Melhum et al. (2006), using standard cross-sectional growth regression, provide 
some evidence that good economic institutions can alleviate the resource curse. To test whether 
economic institutions play a moderating role in shaping the effect of commodity price volatility on 
economic growth, we split our sample between countries with a low and high quality of economic 
institutions  based on rule-of-law  and  corruption  indices  from Political Risk Services  (2009). 
Because the indices reflecting economic institutions range from 0 to 6, we classify countries as 
featuring poor (good) institutions when the average quality of institution indicator (available from 
1985 onward) is below (above) 3. We do find robust evidence that both economic institution indices 
moderate the effect of commodity price volatility on non-resource GDP growth (the results not 
reported in the tables). Also, we confirm that the saving rate increases in countries with high-quality 
economic institutions in the face of higher volatility. Interestingly,  higher volatility leads  to a 
statistically significant decrease in saving in countries with a high degree of corruption but not in 
countries with high standards of rule of law. Indeed, more volatility may, in fact, lead to lower 
saving as it may provide more room for discretionary policies in countries with a poor institutional 
framework. Those results seem to support the view that political institutions as well as economic 
institutions do reduce rent seeking through increased public scrutiny and, thus, lead to higher saving 
rates which, in turn, encourage NRGDP growth in commodity-exporting countries. 
 16 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
We examined in this paper the impact of commodity price volatility on economic growth using a 
panel of up to 158 countries during the period 1970-2007. To do so, we used a new data set on non-
resource GDP which enabled us to avoid the “noise” introduced by the resource sector’s 
contribution to overall GDP. Our main finding is that increased commodity price volatility leads to 
a significant increase in non-resource GDP growth in democracies, but has no significant effect on 
growth in autocracies. We offer  an explanation for this finding by documenting that increased 
commodity price volatility leads to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in net 
national saving in democracies while net national saving decreased significantly in autocracies. Our 
results apply also when we use indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions in lieu of 
indicators of political institutions,  highlighting  the importance of institutions in shaping the 
volatility channel of the resource curse. 
  If we went beyond our positive analysis of the impact of commodity price volatility on 
saving and economic growth  presented in this paper and took a normative standpoint, one 
potentially important direction for further research might be  to determine the optimal level of 
precautionary saving in the face of commodity price volatility. Carroll et al. (2009) model the 
incentives for the residents of a country to hold foreign assets, including the precautionary motive. 
The model suggests a convenient formula for the economy’s target value of assets. However, the 
authors do not model the decision to extract natural resources. A broader portfolio allocation 
strategy of a country should balance the level of natural resource reserves over time with the level 
of net financial assets in response to increased volatility. It, therefore, remains to integrate the 
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